According to Michael Bratman's influential theory of intending, the intention to φ is a distinctive practical attitude marked by its pivotal role in planning for the future. Intention involves desire, but even predominant desire is insufficient for intention, since it need not involve a commitment to act: intentions are "conduct-controlling pro-attitudes, ones which we are disposed to retain without reconsideration, and which play a significant role as inputs to [means-end] reasoning" (Bratman 1987: 20). The plans for action contained in our intentions are typically partial and must be filled out in accordance with changing conditions as the future comes. Intentions are subject in turn to distinctive norms of practical rationality, norms of consistency and means-end coherence. One of the virtues of this conception, and a source of its remarkable influence, is its apparent modularity. Bratman presents his theory of the nature of intention, and of its rationality, as a supplement to the belief-desire model, on which...