The folk concept of intentional action has been the subject of extensive research by experimental philosophers and psychologists (e.g., Alicke, 2008; Knobe, 2003a, 2003b, 2006; Machery, 2008; Malle, 2006; Mele, 2006; Nadelhoffer, 2004, 2006; Nichols & Ulatowski, 2007; Wright & Bengson, 2009). This research has focused primarily on puzzling asymmetries in ordinary people‘s judgments about intentional action. For example, researchers have been concerned with ordinary judgments about the intentional status of side effects, as in the case described in Knobe (2003a), where a negative foreseen side effect of a CEO‘s action—harming the environment—is judged to be intentional while a positive foreseen side effect—helping the environment—is judged to be unintentional. Call any puzzling asymmetry in ordinary judgments about intentional action (whether or not they involve side effects) an intentionality judgment asymmetry. Debate has turned on whether intentionality judgment asymmetries are best explained in terms of the influence of some type of prescriptive judgment (Alicke, 2008; Knobe, 2003a, 2004, 2006; Mele, 2006; Mele & Cushman, 2007; Nadelhoffer, 2004, 2006; Pettit & Knobe, 2009; Uttich & Lombrozo, 2010; Wright & Bengson, 2009) or rather in terms of the interplay between various descriptive judgments (Guglielmo, Monroe, & Malle, 2009; Machery, 2008; Malle, 2006; Nanay, 2010; Sripada, forthcoming). To adjudicate between these two types of accounts—what we will call prescriptivist accounts and descriptivist accounts—Chandra Sripada and Sarah Konrath (forthcoming) used structural equation models (SEMs) to support a descriptivist account put forward by Sripada (forthcoming)—the Deep Self Concordance...