Some of Richard's initial remarks strike a curiously critical tone. We noted that collective agreement tests provide only limited support to claims of shared content. Acknowledging this, Richard then argues that the relevant limitations do not carry over to collective disagreement reports. We agree. Indeed the points that he makes in this connection are ones that we ourselves make in the book (see e.g. RMT pp.62-63). At the end of his Section one, Richard oversimplifies the dialectical situation considerably. He says that the upshot of our discussion in Chapter two is that there is a very strong argument for relativistic content. The situation in all the core cases is much more complicated. Take predicates of personal taste - 'fun' for example. There are indeed cases where standard contextualism predicts disparate content but where the disagreement diagnostic provides prima facie evidence for the claim of shared content promoted by a standard relativist view. But there are plenty of other cases where the predictions yielded by relativistic semantics do not sit well at all with the deliverances of that diagnostic (see e.g. RMT p.109). There is, thus, prima facie troubling data that each side has to explain away. Richard, like many relativists, is overly encouraged by a limited diet of examples. Let us turn to the nature of disagreement, the topic of Richard's Section two. As Richard anticipates we are sympathetic to a pretty simple view of disagreement: We disagree about a proposition if one of us believes it and one of us believes the negation.1 Some relativists – notably MacFarlane – have thought that there are considerations that show that such a view must be wrong, even leaving the general issue of relativism to the side. One paradigmatic argument of this sort is to the effect that if someone in world w1 believes p and someone in world w2 believes not-p, they are not thereby disagreeing. Richard displays some sympathy to this line of argument. He shouldn't...