1. For many philosophers, particularly among those who have found their inspiration in Wittgenstein's later work, appeals to the distinction between what does and does not make sense seem to be an important part of philosophical method. Wittgenstein himself said that his aim was to teach his readers to pass from disguised nonsense to patent nonsense (Philo- sophical Investigations, § 464), and he gave numerous examples of the use of this method. I shall try to argue, however, that it is not clear precisely how invocations of nonsense in philosophy are to be understood. My aim in this essay is to try to clarify the role or status of such invocations. I shall do so through a discussion of the reading of Wittgenstein's view of nonsense put forward by Cora Diamond. In her essay 'What Nonsense Might Be'1, Cora Diamond discusses different ways of understanding the concept of nonsense. She defines and criticizes what she calls a 'natural' view of nonsense, and points to the possibility of a different view, which she says is the one to be found in Frege, and also in the Tractatus as well as in Philosophical Investigations. Let me briefly recapture her argument. Consider the sentences...