Can
the
phenomenal
character
of
perceptual
experience
be
altered
by
the
states
of
 one’s
cognitive
system,
for
example,
one’s
thoughts
or
beliefs?
If
one
thinks
that
this
 can
happen
(at
least
in
certain
ways
that
are
identified
in
the
paper)
then
one
 thinks
that
there
can
be
cognitive
penetration
of
perceptual
experience;
otherwise,
 one
thinks
that
perceptual
experience
is
cognitively
impenetrable.
I
claim
that
 there
is
one
alleged
case
of
cognitive
penetration
that
cannot
be
explained
away
by
 the
standard
strategies
one
can
typically
use
to
explain
away
alleged
cases.
The
 case
is
one
in
which
it
seems
subjects’
beliefs
about
the
typical
colour
of
objects
 affects
their
colour
experience.
I
propose
a
two­step
mechanism
of
indirect
 cognitive
penetration
that
explains
how
cognitive
penetration
may
occur.
I
show
 that
there
is
independent
evidence
that
each
step
in
this
process
can
occur.
I
 suspect
that
people
who
are
opposed
to
the
idea
that
perceptual
experience
is
 cognitively
penetrable
will
be
less
opposed
to
the
idea
when
they
come
to
consider
 this
indirect
mechanism
and
that
those
who
are
generally
sympathetic
to
the
idea
 of
cognitive
penetrability
will
welcome
the
elucidation
of
this
plausible
mechanism.