It seems undeniable that such second-personal speech acts as promising A to φ1 and telling A that p serve at least in part to give an assurance to the addressee. Whatever your other aims, part of what you’re doing when you promise or tell A is inviting A, whether sincerely or insincerely, to take you at your word.2 Though you may despair of getting A to accept it, since you may know that A does not regard you as worthy of his trust, the invitation seems to include an assurance that he can rely on you in some respect – or, hypothetically, that he could, if only he’d get over his mistrust.3 Promisings and tellings differ, of course, in the content of the assurance. When you promise A to φ, you give A the assurance that you’ll φ and thereby that he has a reason to perform (or not to avoid performing) acts that depend on your φing. But what is the content of your assurance when you tell A that p? Exactly how do you suppose he might rely on you? And...