Partial Belief, Full Belief, and Accuracy–Dominance


Συγγραφέας: Branden Fitelson, Kenny Easwaran


Branden Fitelson, Kenny Easwaran: Partial Belief, Full Belief, and Accuracy–Dominance (pdf, 4 pages)
Arguments for probabilism aim to undergird/motivate a synchronic probabilistic coherence norm for partial beliefs. Standard arguments for probabilism are all of the form: An agent S has a non-probabilistic partial belief function b iff (⇐⇒) S has some “bad” property B (in virtue of the fact that their p.b.f. b has a certain kind of formal property F). These arguments rest on Theorems (⇒) and Converse Theorems (⇐): b is non-Pr ⇐⇒ b has formal property F.