Two views dominate the contemporary discussion of persistence. Perdurance is the view that object persist through time by having distinct parts (‘temporal parts’) at each moment at which they exist, so that persistence through time is just like ordinary extension through space. Endurance is the view that objects are wholly (not merely partially) present at each moment at which they exist, and objects thus persist through time by being present at different times. These different views give rise in turn to distinctive views on further metaphysical topics. Recently, Cody Gilmore (2007) has used some of these further consequences to develop an argument against perdurantism and in favour of endurantism. More specifically, he argues that perdurantism and endurantism involve different conceptions of what the location of a persisting object is, and that in certain cases, the perdurantistic conception of location seems to force the perdurantist to accept that there are coincident objects: distinct objects constituted by the same things and occupying the same location. Given that most philosophers reject the possibility of coincidence, this situation is a cost to the perdurantist.1 When one recalls that many take the supposed ability of perdurance theory to explain away cases of coincidence to which the endurantist appears committed to be the strongest argument in favour of perdurance, the cost is even more...