How can collective decisions be made among individuals with conflicting preferences or judgments? Arrow’s impossibility theorem and other social-choice-theoretic results suggest that, for many collective decision problems, there are no attractive democratic solutions. In response, deliberative democrats argue that group deliberation makes collective decisions more tractable. How can deliberation accomplish this? In this chapter, I explore the distinction between two different types of agreement and discuss how they can facilitate collective decision making. Deliberative democrats have traditionally defended the hypothesis that group deliberation generates consensus on what decision option should be chosen: substantive agreement. But substantive agreement is not only empirically unrealistic, but also logically unnecessary for meaningful collective decision making. An alternative, less demanding hypothesis is that, under certain conditions, group deliberation generates consensus on how a decision problem should be conceptualized: meta-agreement. I assess the latter hypothesis, explain how it can be empirically tested, and cite some evidence consistent with it. My discussion addresses two contexts of democratic decision making: preference aggregation and judgment aggregation.