In the first chapter of From Metaphysics to Ethics, Frank Jackson begins, as he puts it, ‘by explaining how serious metaphysics by its very nature raises the location problem.’ (1998, p. 1) He gives us two examples of location problems. The first concems semantic properties, such as truth and reference: Some physical structures are true. For example, if I were to utter a token of the type ‘Grass is green’, the structure I would thereby bring into existence would be true How are the semantic properties of the sentence related to the non-semantic properties of the sentence? VVhere, if anywhere, are the semantic properties of truth, content and reference to be found in the non-semantic, physical or naturalistic account of the sentence?’ (1998, p. 2) Jackson notes two possible answers to questions of this kind. The first denies that there are any such semantic properties: We might respond with a sceptical or eliminativist position on truth, meaning and reference. Sentences are a species of physical object, and we know that science can in principle tell us the whole story about physical objects. And though we are not, and may never be, in a position actually to give that whole story, we know enough as of now to be able to say, first, that it will look something like a story about masses, shapes, causal chains, behavioural dispositions of language users, evolutionary history, and the like and, secondly, that in any case it will not contain terms for truth, reference and meaning. But if the complete account does not contain truth, reference, and meaning, then so much the worse for truth, reference, and meaning, runs the sceptical response. (1998, p. 2) Jackson constrasts this sceptical response with the response he favours, which rests on ‘distinguishing what appears explicitly in an account from what appears implicitly in it.’ (1998, p. 2) This is the idea that he goes on to develop in the book in considerable detail. The case of the semantic properties deserves its prominence, I think, though for reasons Jackson himself does not mention at this point...