The philosophy of science that grew out of logical positivism tended to construe scientific knowledge in terms of set of interconnected beliefs about the world, such as theories and observation statements. Confirmation was construed as a logical relation between observation statements and theoretical statements. This was dubbed the ‘context of justification] to be contrasted with the context of discovery, where discovery was not generally deemed to be a rational process and thus not a concern for philosophy. During the last few decades this vision of philosophy of science has changed. Nowadays discovery (e.g., in experimental biology) is seen as intimately tied to confirmation and explanation (Brigandt 2011c). Science is not just conceived of as a set of axiomatic systems, but as a dynamic process based on the various practices of individual scientists and the institutional settings of science (Brigandt 2011a). Two features particularly influence the dynamics of scientific knowledge: epistemic standards and aims. An existing standard (be it a methodological standard, an evidential standard, or a standard of explanatory adequacy) accounts for why old beliefs had to be abandoned and new beliefs came to be accepted. At the same time, standards are subject to change as well. Epistemic aims (assumptions about what issues are currently in need of scientific study and explanation)