When one thinks truly, what one thinks is what is the case. That is, when one thinks truly that wombats are fast runners, then what one thinks—that wombats are fast runners—is the same as what is the case—that wombats are fast runners.1 In this truistic thought lies the germ of the identity theory of truth. For, in the broadest terms, the identity theory of truth holds that truth is a matter of identity between how things are and how one takes them to be. So characterized, however, the identity theory can seem merely truistic. More substantive versions of the position identify particular types of entity such as truth-bearers and truth-makers, or perhaps true propositions and facts. In particular, identity theorists, motivated in part by the above truism and in part by dissatisfaction with the correspondence theory of truth, typically assert that when a bearer of truth and falsity, such as a proposition, is true, there is no ‘ontological gap’ between it and the way things are. Yet it is precisely the absence of an ontological gap between truth-bearer and truth-maker that can make the identity theory seem implausible. For a start, anyone who holds that truth-bearers are linguistic entities will find the identity theory a non-starter. For the world is certainly nothing like this: