Foundationalists end the well-known regress of justification by appealing to beliefs that are properly basic.1 They are justified, but not justified by further beliefs or belief-like states. The principal task for a foundationalist is to explain exactly how properly basic beliefs--epistemic "prime movers"—acquire positive epistemic status or justification. On this question, a foundationalist could be either an externalist or an internalist. An externalist will say that a belief is properly basic if it is formed in the right sort of way (by a reliable cognitive process, or in a way that tracks the truth) and it is not justified by other beliefs. This account has at least the virtue of simplicity. By contrast, the internalist’s task of giving an account of what makes it the case that a belief is properly basic is more complicated. The standard account is that, for many of our beliefs, it is experience that provides the justification for properly basic beliefs (see, e.g. Lewis 1929). However, spelling out precisely what this amounts to is a very difficult enterprise (see, e.g. BonJour 1985, 1999, 2001, 2003; Fumerton 1995, 2001; Moser 1989; Bergmann 2006, 2007). In this paper we want to set out and defend what we take to be a promising account of internalist proper basicality. We will begin by spelling out what we...