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Replacements for Truth |
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Συγγραφέας: Kevin Scharp Kevin Scharp: Replacements for Truth (pdf, 49 pages) Although truth continues to be one of the most central and useful concepts in our repertoire, the very fact that we possess it at all has come to be a serious impediment to our ongoing struggle to understand our place in the universe. The problem is that truth gives rise to paradoxes, the most famous of which is the liar paradox. It might seem like a gross exaggeration to say that the liar paradox poses a threat to us because it almost never causes any trouble in everyday conversation. However, it does pose a serious problem for anyone who wants to understand human language and thought, two of our most distinctive and perplexing features. It turns out that attempts to explain the content of natural language sentences by doing semantics founder on sentences that contain truth predicates. The problem concerns only certain occurrences and can take one of three forms: (i) the semantic theory makes obviously false predictions, (ii) the semantic theory is inconsistent or self-refuting, or (iii) the sentences in question are excluded from the scope of the semantic theory.1 The problem for thought is analogous—the dominant model takes thoughts to be mental attitudes toward propositions and any theory of these thought contents faces the same trilemma for certain thoughts that have truth as a constituent. |
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