Apparently, Polish logicians count differently from most people. This is because they operate with different numerical criteria. Disagreements between them and us about how many objects there are in a room will look not only insuperable but also unintelligible unless the differences between their system and ours are brought into the light. Similarly, if we are to put the debate about how many Wittgensteins there are on a proper footing it will be important to establish the criterion according to which we are making our count. Just as we individuate Russells and Putnams by the number of significant changes in their approaches to philosophy (the former case yielding a legion), so too has the familiar debate over whether there is one or two Wittgensteins been conducted against the background of the now controversial claim that there was a radical break in his thinking. This is regularly presented as a sea change in his views about language, dividing the work of his initial period which culminated in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, from the writings of his later period which found their first mature expression in the Philosophical Investigations and continued along the same lines until the very end, including the musings of On Certainty. The nature of this break focuses on the alleged change in his understanding of the way language operates. Traditionally, it is supposed that he abandoned his purely referential 'theory' about picturing and its attendant metaphysics in favour of the idea that 'meaning is use'. Inter alia, this understanding frequently partners the claim that his philosophy underwent an important shift from realism to anti-realism in the process. There are two main ways of understanding the nature of this change and, consequently, the relation between the early and later writings.1 According to some, the later works develop a new, successor theory that replaces the early one. For others, the change heralded the introduction of an anti-theoretical dimension to his thinking, isolating his theoretical ambitions to his early period.2 Although these readings disagree about the status of the Investigations, they are united in holding that his early approach to philosophy is defined by theoretical concerns, broadly construed. This interpretation of the Tractatus has recently been challenged by those who seek to demonstrate that it cannot be easily reconciled with his claim, made during both periods, that he was not engaged in any form of philosophical theorising at all...